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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

In this case, the Appellant, Nicole Packer, (hereinafter “Packer” 0r “Appellant”), alleged

that

Defendant Riverbend Communications,

(hereinafter “Riverbend”)

LLC

and Riverbend Communications Holding,

and Kingston Properties, L.P. and

DK Enterprises, Inc.

LLC

(“hereinafter

“Kingston”) were negligent and that such negligence caused her to sustain certain personal
injuries

held

at

due

t0 a fall

Which occurred 0n December

Kingston Plaza in Idaho

Falls, Idaho.

4,

Packer

2015
fell

at the

Christmas Expo Trade

Show

off a loading dock after she exited the

building through the back door, into the nighttime darkness, even though she admits she could

not see the area in front 0f her, and even though she had a cell phone with ﬂashlight that she

failed to use.

NATURE OF THE CASE

A.

Packer appeals from the

RECONSIDER,

DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

case number, CV-17-7024, February 28, 2019,

DISMISSAL AND JUDGMENT,

number CV-17-7024, December

11, 2018.

FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.

B.

1.

Undisputed Facts in the Record.

Packer was

a.

was

case

DECISION AND ORDER OF

at the

selling items as a

Packer depo

Kingston Plaza on the date of the accident because she

vendor

at 39:2-25;

at the

Christmas Expo Trade Show.

facility as

at

1,

pp. 70-71;

she previously worked

other events selling items as a vendor in that facility. (Id. at R., V01.

depo

Vol.

4021-25; 4121-25; 42: 1-2).

Packer was familiar With the Kingston Plaza

b.

(R.,

50:19-25; 51:1-12).

1, p.

73; Packer

c.

Nevertheless, Packer claims that she exited the back door of the facility because

that morning, when she arrived, she was told to do so by Riverbend’s employee, Jay Dye.
(Id. at R., Vol. 1, 75-76; Packer depo at 57:24-25; 58:1-12).
d.

Although the front door of the facility remained open, Packer exited out the back

door of the facility in the evening, when it was dark outside. (R., Vol. 1, p. 75; 58:23-25;
59:1-6). She testified that she could only see lights in the distance over the parking lot.
(R., Vol. 1, p. 82; 88:13-20). She also claims that there were no working lights outside
the door she exited, despite photographs showing multiple lights existed in the area where
she exited the building. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 55-57).
e.

Packer testified that as she exited the back door, it suddenly shut and locked

behind her. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 80-81; Packer depo at 80:7-25; 81:1-25; 82:1-23).
f.

The door that Packer exited was not equipped with an automatic closing or

locking mechanism as she has claimed. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 116).
g.

Packer fell off of a loading dock behind the facility after she took several steps

forward away from the back door, in the dark. (R., Vol. 1, p. 13; pp. 81-82; Packer depo
at 84:7-25; 85:1-20). Although Packer admitted having her cell phone with her, she
denies knowing that the cell phone could be used to provide her light to see ahead. (R..
Vol. 1, p. 82; Packer depo at 85:21-25; 86:1-15).
2.

Procedural History.

On October 9, 2018, Riverbend filed a Motion for Summary Judgment along with a
Memorandum and Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 3663). On October 9, 2018, Kingston also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment along with a
Memorandum and Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 64-

2

93). On October 25, 2018, Packer filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment.
(R., Vol. 1, pp. 94-102). Also on October 25, 2018, Packer filed a Brief in Opposition to
Motions for Summary Judgment by Riverbend along with a Affidavit. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 103-118).
On November 1, 2018, Riverbend filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Nicole Packer, its
Reply Brief Re: Motion for Summary Judgment, and a Supplemental Affidavit. (R., Vol. 1, pp.
119-138). On November 7, 2018, Packer filed a Brief in Opposition to Motion to Strike and
Second Brief in Opposition to Riverbend’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 139145).
Thereafter, on November 30, 2018, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision
on Kingston’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing Packer’s negligence claim against
Kingston. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 146-153). Also on November 30, 2018, the District Court issued its
Memorandum Decision on Defendant Riverbend’s Motion for Summary Judgment which
granted the motion dismissing Packer’s negligence claim against Riverbend. (R., Vol. 1, pp.
154-161). The District Court also issued its Memorandum Decision on Defendants Motion to
Strike, denying the motion. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 162-167). On December 11, 2018, the District Court
issued its Order of Dismissal and Judgment of Dismissal as to Kingston and its Judgment to
Dismiss With Prejudice as to Riverbend. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 168-173).
Then, on December 24, 2018, Packer filed a Motion to Reconsider and Brief in Support
of Motion to Reconsider in re: Riverbend Communications, LLC. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 174-181). On
January 31, 2019, Riverbend filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to
Reconsider. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 187-198). On February 7, 2019, Packer filed a Reply Memorandum
in Support of Motion to Reconsider. (R., Vol. 2, pp. 204-209).
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On February 28,

2019, the Court issued

its

On April

for Reconsideration. (R., V01. 2, pp. 210-225).

Appeal. (R., Vol.

226-23 1).

2, pp.

Memorandum Decision on Plaintiff’s Motion

On April 22,

2019, Riverbend ﬁled a Request for Additional

Clerk’s Record 0n Appeal. (R., V01. 2, pp. 232-234).

issued.

(SUPP.

held 0n

November

Strike

R., pp. 1-26).

18,

On July

7,

2019 0n

A Supplemental Clerk’s Record was

14, 2019, a transcript

2018 0n Riverbend’s Motion

and 0n February

Plaintiff’s

2019, Packer ﬁled a Notice 0f

11,

for

Motion

was lodged from

the oral arguments

Summary Judgment and Motion t0

t0 Reconsider.

(TR, pp. 1-26).

On October

25, 2019, Appellant’s Brief was ﬁled.

ATTORNEY’S FEES ON APPEAL

II.

Riverbend requests attorney’s fees 0n appeal pursuant

t0

LC. §12-121 and/or I.R.C.P.

54(e)(1) because this case has been “brought, pursued 0r defended frivolously and without

foundation”. State, Dept. ofTransp.

III.

v.

Grathol, 158 Idaho 38, 343 P.3d 480 (2015).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On an appeal from an order 0f summary judgment,
is

the

same

as the standard used

Lockhead Martin Corp.

v.

by the

trial

Idaho State Tax

this

Court’s standard 0f review

court in ruling on the motion for

Comm ’n,

summary judgment.

142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644

(2006). All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the

non-moving

party,

and

all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are t0 be drawn in favor 0f the non-

moving

party. Id.

burden of proof at

Where
trial,

a motion for

the

summary judgment

non-moving party must

is

Who

has the

evidence of a genuine

non-moving

party's case.

Sparks

v.

Medical Center, 115 Idaho 505, 509, 768 P.2d 768, 772 (1988). “N0

afﬁrmative duty to produce evidence rests on the party moving for
the

against a party

set forth sufﬁcient

issue of material fact t0 support each essential element of the

St.Luke's Regional

made

moving party has n0

summary judgment, and

obligation t0 negate the opponent's claim”. Celotex Corp.

4

v.

Catrett,

477

US
t0

317, 323 (1986).

The Court

is

“not required t0

comb through

the record t0

ﬁnd some reason

deny a motion for summary judgment.” Carmen

v.

San Francisco Uniﬁed Sch.

2001) (quoting Forsberg

v.

Pac. Northwest Bell

F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th

Cir.

1409, 1418 (9th Cir. 1988)). The only issues considered on

by the

pleadings. Esser Electric

v.

Dist.,

Tel. C0.,

summary judgment

237

840 F.2d

are those raised

Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Ina, 145 Idaho 912, 919,

188 P.3d 854, 861 (2008).

Summary judgment

is

appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on ﬁle,

show

together With the afﬁdavits, if any,

moving party

that the

Corp.

fact,

v.

is

entitled t0

Idaho State Tax

Comm ’n,

that there is

judgment

n0 genuine issue

as a matter of law. See

supra. If the evidence reveals

any material

as t0

1.

Did the

and

Rule 56; Lockhead Martin

no disputed

issues 0f material

then only a question 0f law remains, over which this Court exercises free review.

IV.

fact

Id.

ISSUES

District Court properly dismiss Packer’s negligence claim against

Riverbend under I.R.C.P. 56(0)?
2.

Did the

District

Court properly deny Packer’s Motion t0 Reconsider under

I.R.C.P. 11.2(b)?

V.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY FOUND THERE WAS NO
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT PRESENTED ON PACKER’S
NEGLIGENCE CLAIM PREDICATED ON PREMISES LIABILITY.
1.

The

District

Court Correctly Found That Packer

Based upon the allegations raised by Packer’s pleadings, the
analyzed Riverbend’s potential

liability as

Was A Licensee.

District

Court correctly

a possessor 0f land at the time that Packer attended

the Christmas Expo. (See Complaint, R., Vol. 1, pp. 12-13; Memorandum Decision, R., Vol. 1,
pp. 154-161; R., Vol. 2, p. 215).
In making its summary judgment decision, the District Court recognized that Idaho courts
have long held that the duty of owners and possessors of land is to be determined by the status of
the person injured on the land (i.e whether the person is an invitee, licensee, or trespasser). (See
R., Vol. 1, pp. 156); see also O’Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 122 P.3d 308 (2005);
Holzheimer v. Johnannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 871 P.2d 814 (1994). The difference is that, “an
invitee is characterized as one who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose connected
with the business conducted on the land, or where it can reasonably be said that the visit may
confer a business, commercial, monetary or other tangible benefit to the landowner”, whereas “a
licensee is a visitor who enters with the consent of the landowner in pursuit of the visitor’s
purpose”. O’Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 122 P.3d 308 (2005); see also Holzheimer
v. Johnannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 871 P.2d 814 (1994); Pincock v. McCoy, 48 Idaho 227, 281 P.
371 (1929). Idaho case law clearly teaches that to determine the status of a visitor to land,
requires that we focus on the visitor’s purposes for the visitor’s presence on the land.
The District Court correctly rejected Packer’s argument made in her pleadings that she
was an invitee, rather than a licensee. The Court’s decision was based on the undisputed facts in
the record which confirm that Packer attended the event in order to sell her services and products
at the Christmas Expo for her own benefit and profit. (R., Vol. 1, p. 154; and R., Vol. 1, p. 70;
Packer depo at pp. 39-40). The District Court, relying, in part, on Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho
535, 347 P.2d 341 (1959), properly found that the mere fact that Ms. Packer may have conferred
some tangential benefit upon Riverbend does not change the relationship between Ms. Packer
and Riverbend as licensee and landowner. (R., Vol. 1, p. 157). “Ms. Packer’s purpose on
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December 5th was to seek out her own business opportunity, and was not there as a patron of the
expo”. (R., Vol. 1, p. 158). Similarly, this Court in Mooney v. Robinson, 93 Idaho 676, 471
P.2d 63 (1970), held that the rendition by a social guest of an incidental economic benefit to the
occupier of premises will not change the guest’s status as a licensee. In that case, in addition to a
social visit, the other purpose for the injured Plaintiff’s presence at the Defendants’ rented home
was to pay a portion of the substantial purchase price for a dog purchased the defendants. In
short, the Court describes a partial payment of a “substantial” sale, yet holds that this incidental
benefit does not alter the status of the licensee. Importantly, in this case, Plaintiff has not
provided proof of any benefit, of any kind from Packer to Riverbend. Although Packer’s counsel
argues some benefit was given by Packer to Riverbend, there is no evidence in this record to
support that claim. The record is devoid of any evidence of any benefit conveyed by Packer to
Riverbend, neither incidental, or consequential. To establish that Packer is an invitee, she must
produce some evidence that at the time of the event, she conferred commercial, monetary, or
other tangible benefit to Riverbend. Packer failed to provide any such evidence and in her
Appellant’s Brief at pp. 15 -16, cites the Court to nothing in the record to support the claim of
counsel. Speculation by counsel about the purpose of an “event center”, or the business model,
or revenue sources is not evidence that is admissible to oppose summary judgement. IRCP Rule
56. As a result of the failure to place into the record facts to support the claimed status, Packer is
properly classified as a “licensee” as the District Court held.
Although Packer has now challenged the District Court’s reasoning, arguing in her
Appellate Brief at pp. 15-16 that she was an invitee because the business purpose of an “events
center” is to host events and to generate income, this argument should be disregarded first
because the nature of the event or the event center’s business model was not raised by Packer on

7

summary judgment or on her Motion to Reconsider. This argument was raised for the first time
on appeal. “It is well established that issues not raised in the court below are deemed to have
been waived and such issues will not be considered on appeal”. See Campbell v. Parkway
Surgery Center, LLC, 158 Idaho 957, 961, 354 P.3d 1172, 1176 (2015); Selkirk-Priest Basin
Ass’n v. State, 127 Idaho 239, 245, 899 P.2d 949, 955 (1995); Matter of Estate of Reinwald, 122
Idaho 401, 402, 834 P.2d 1317, 1318 (1992); Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co.,
119 Idaho 87, 93, 803 P.2d 993, 998 (1991); Rosales v. Balbas, 125 Idaho 848, 850, 875 P.2d
945, 947 (Ct. App. 1994).
In addition, this new argument should be rejected because it is without support in the
record, or merit. Packer’s new argument is entirely based upon conclusory assumptions of
counsel, not evidence or legal authority in the record. Counsel assumes, without factual basis,
what type of business that Kingston Plaza actually was, what an “events center” was defined to
be, what the business model and practice of an events center was, and how an events center
derives income, if any. For these reasons, the convoluted argument that Kingston Plaza is an
“events center” deriving its primary income from vendors, thereby making Packer an invitee,
should be rejected as not supported by any fact in evidence.
2.

The District Court Correctly Found That Packer Had Failed To Raise
A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact On Riverbend’s Alleged Breach Of
Duty.

As Packer was correctly deemed a licensee, the District Court properly established
Riverbend’s duty to Packer as narrowly restricted, and was only to share its knowledge of known
dangerous conditions or activities on the property with Packer. Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400,
732 P.2d 369 (1987). When Riverbend challenged the lack of a duty or breach of duty to Packer,
the Court required Packer to meet her burden under IRCP Rule 56, to show that Riverbend had
8

actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition and that it failed to warn her of this
dangerous condition. (See R., Vol. 1, pp.158-159; R., Vol. 2, p. 215; see also Brooks v. WalMart Stores, 2018 Ida. LEXIS 91 (2018). Packer simply failed to meet this burden to place into
the record any admissible evidence to support her claimed duty and breach of duty. (R., Vol. 1,
p. 160).
Packer incorrectly argues that the District Court misapplied the standards under I.R.C.P.
56(c) when reaching its summary judgment decision. (Appellate Brief at pp. 9-12) (relying
principally on Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994).
After resolving all inferences in the record in favor of Packer as contemplated by Rule 56 and
Friel, the District Court found that Jay Dye told Packer to use the back door of the building to
exit the building on the morning of December 4, 2015. (R., Vol. 1, p. 12, R., Vol. 1, pp. 159160; Vol. 2, pp. 219-221) (emphasis added). This is important because Riverbend has at all
times denied that Jay Dye ever told Packer to use the back door to exit the building. (See R.,
Vol. 1, p. 22; R., Vol. 1, p. 126; TR, p. 23).
However, assuming for summary judgment that the comment was made by Jay Dye that
morning, the District Court correctly found that Packer failed to come forward with any evidence
showing that: 1) it was dark outside when the alleged statement was made because it was
morning; 2) Jay Dye would have known it would be dark outside when Packer decided to exit
the building; 3) Jay Dye knew that lights outside that door were not working or were poorly lit.
(R., Vol. 1, pp. 159-160; Vol. 2, pp. 219-221).
Whether Jay Dye had reason to believe any of the foregoing is not an issue of fact for a
jury to decide as is claimed by Packer in her Appellate Brief at p. 11. In order to oppose
summary judgment, it was Packer’s burden to come forward with admissible evidence of the
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duty owed by Riverbend to Packer, and a breach of that duty by Riverbend. In other words, to
survive the motion, Packer must present admissible evidence that Jay Dye had actual or
constructive knowledge of the claimed dangerous condition on the land. Packer failed to do so
in any of her multiple opposition pleadings on summary judgment (Packer filed two briefs
opposing summary judgment and two briefs supporting the motion to reconsider) and she failed
to seek relief under I.R.C.P. 56(f). There was simply no evidence presented by Packer showing
the specific duty allegedly owed or a breach of duty owing to her as a licensee by Riverbend, two
essential elements of Packer’s case. Accordingly, her failure to satisfy the requirements of Rule
56 justified the District Court’s decision that premises liability did not attach to Riverbend, and
it justifies affirming the District Court’s decision on appeal. (R., Vol. 1, p. 160).
Similarly, the District Court’s subsequent reconsideration decision that premises liability
did not attach to Riverbend was proper, and should also be upheld on appeal. (R., Vol. 2, p.
215). The record confirms that Packer failed to present any new evidence on her Motion to
Reconsider made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11.2(b). (R., Vol. 2, p. 215). It is well-settled that “a
motion for reconsideration should not be used to ask a court “’to rethink what the court had
already thought through-rightly or wrongly”’. See Laya v. Pima County, Ariz., 2009 WK
2485996 (D. Ariz. 2009); citing Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D.
99, 101 (E.D.Va.1983); cf., Agric. Research & Tech. Group, 916 F.2d at 542. As Packer simply
reargued that she was an invitee in her request for reconsideration, rather than providing any new
evidence that Jay Dye knew or should have known the condition of the lights outside the exit and
whether they were turned off or not working, the District Court’s denial of the Motion to
Reconsider was appropriate. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 177-178; R., Vol. 2, p. 215; R., Vol. 2, pp. 204209).
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B.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT PACKER
FAILED TO PLEAD A NEGLIGENCE CLAIM APART FROM
PREMISES LIABILITY.

The District Court also correctly decided that since Packer failed to plead a claim for
“ordinary negligence” apart from premises liability, this claim could not be considered on for the
first time on Motion to Reconsider, and was not proven (as noted above, lacked proof of duty
and breach of duty). (R., Vol. 2, pp. 212-219; see also R., Vol. 1, 12-13; see also Edmonson v.
Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 178, 75 P.3d 733, 739 (2003) (noting that “a cause of
action not raised in a party’s pleadings may not be considered on summary judgment, nor may it
be considered for the first time on appeal”). The obvious rationale for this accepted rule is that
“afterthoughts” or “shifting ground” are not an appropriate bases for reconsideration of summary
judgment. See Refrigeration Sales Co. v. Mitchell-Jackson, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 6, 7 (N.D. Ill
1983).
In reaching its decision that Packer’s Complaint failed to provide notice that she intended
to assert an “ordinary negligence” claim under both premises liability and ordinary negligence,
the District Court emphasized the comparable cases of Brown v.City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802,
229 P.3d 1164 (2010) and Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. North Pacific Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241,
178 P.3d 606 (2007). By examining Packer’s Complaint under the liberal notice pleading
standard discussed in those cases, the District Court appropriately concluded that it did not
reasonably imply a theory of ordinary negligence. “Even under a liberal pleading standard, a
complaint must reasonably imply the theory upon which relief is being sought”. Davis at 808,
1170. The District Court appropriately emphasized the fact that Riverbend’s summary judgment
briefing focused on the theory of premises liability, not any other negligence theory as this was
all that it could see from the Complaint as the basis for Packer’s request for relief.
11

Signiﬁcantly, Packer’s

liability.

It

summary judgment brieﬁng

was only 0n her Motion

t0

also focused solely

Reconsider that Packer ﬁrst tried to

0n premises

interj ect

her

new

negligence theory into this case, springing an entirely different cause of action onto Defendants
after the District

Court had dismissed the case on summary judgment. Idaho courts have

explicitly prohibited this practice as

807, 1169.

premises

Where Packer

liability,

it

denies due and fair notice to a defendant. Brown, supra, at

failed t0 properly raise a negligence claim in her pleadings apart

the District Court correctly granted

V01. 2, p. 219). Finally, even

more

summary judgment

a licensee. Evans

v.

t0 Riverbend. (R.,

telling is the long held principal that “ordinary negligence

allowing an unsafe condition 0r activity 0n the property
liability to

from

Park,

1

is

insufﬁcient,

by

itself, to

impose

12 Idaho 400, 732 P.2d 369 (1987). Therefore, the could

not succeed 0n an “ordinary negligence” claim under the undisputed facts 0f this case, and the
District

Court properly dismissed the negligence claims.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT PACKER HAD
NO CLAIM BASED UPON SECTION 311 OF THE RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS.

C.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 allows reconsideration of an interlocutory order.

However,

“it

does not allow for the Court to consider deciding an entirely

previously raised”. See Pandrea

v.

Barrett, 160 Idaho 165, 174,

new claim not

369 P.3d 943, 953 (2015).

Packer shifted ground again on her negligence claim because she claims misrepresentation based

on §3 11 0f the Restatement (Second) 0f Torts
Riverbend for theﬁrst time

Complaint and did not

As Idaho law

in

her Motion

raise this theory

t0

as a

new

imposing

tort liability

on

Reconsider. Packer did not plead this theory in her

of liability in response t0 the summary judgment motion.

clearly disallowed reconsideration 0f the

new misrepresentation

legal theory for

summary judgment

claim, the District Court’s denial 0f the

12

Motion

t0

decision 0n Packer’s

Reconsider 0n

this

new

claim was proper and should be afﬁrmed.
Further, the District Court determined that even if Packer

had properly pled §311 of the

Restatement (Second) of Torts, that claim could not support reversal of summary judgment and
correctly found that

it

had no application

t0 the undisputed facts in this case. (R., V01.

1,

pp.

222-224). The basis of the decision below was that in the cases Where §311 was considered as a
theory for imposing tort

liability,

case; namely,justiﬁable reliance

UGGLA, 535 S.W. 3d 864
required

two required elements were lacking from Packer’s proof in
0n an aﬂirmative misstatement

(See

offact.

v.

(Tenn. 2017) (ﬁnding that a negligent afﬁrmative misstatement

by §3 1 1, not just a non-disclosure) (Emphasis added); Maneely

Corp, 108 F.3d 1176

Grogan

(9th Cir.

v.

this

is

General Motors

1997) (requiring that a defendant negligently provide false

information under §311); McLachlan

v.

New

York Life

(emphasizing that an afﬁrmative misstatement, not

Ins. C0.,

488 F.3d 624

(5th Cir.

iust non—disclosure is required

2017)

bV $31 1,

because the court was unwilling t0 create an afﬁrmative duty t0 disclosure that would require

everyone to warn everyone else of various physical dangers, regardless of the relationship); Hall
v.

Ford Enterprises,

communication 0f a
City

ofNew

injured

Ltd.,

445 A.2d 610 (D.C. 1982) (similarly requiring a negligent

false statement that

York, 82

When he dove

N.Y.2d

66, 623

was

relied

upon

t0 the plaintiff” s detriment);

N.E.2d 541 (1993) (wherein diver Who was seriously

off 0f a jetty into shallow water could not hold lifeguard liable under §3 11

because the diver’s reliance was unforeseeable or uniustiﬁed); Tyree

319 Ga. App. 330, 331, 735 S.E.2d 127, 128 (2012) (wherein

when the

Heard v.

plaintiff walked through a revolving

v.

liability

Westin Peachtree, Ina,

under §311 was not found

door and was injured despite the fact that the

door’s recorded voice instruction told the plaintiff t0 step forward as this

information).
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was not

false

The District Court properly disagreed with Packer’s argument that Jay Dye “implied” to
her that exiting through the back door was safe, and thus had made a negligent
misrepresentation. The fact that Packer has to argue that the alleged misrepresentation was
“implied” is proof of the absence of an “affirmative misrepresentation” in this record. Although
argued by Riverbend on summary judgment, but not addressed specifically by the District Court,
this case has facts which are very similar to those facts involved in the case of Manahan v. Yacht
Haven Hotel, 821 F. Supp. 1110 (D.V.I. 1992). In the Manahan case, the plaintiff was
physically assaulted by an unknown male who attempted to snatch her purse, and causing the
loss of her eye when she was walking between her hotel and a restaurant at night. The plaintiff
attempted to hold the hotel and its concierge liable under §311 because the concierge allegedly
told her that the street route between the hotel and restaurant was “well lit” and therefore, “safe”.
The court rejected the plaintiff’s theory because she could not show that she reasonably relied
upon that statement and that such reliance was the proximate cause of her injuries.
The court in Manahan emphasized that the plaintiff could not have relied upon that
statement since she admitted to discerning that the street route between the hotel and the
restaurant was not “well lit” before encountering the dangers presented therein. The court made
the following key points when reaching its decision:
One may not blindly act upon a statement in disregard of an opportunity to learn
the truth when exercise of ordinary attention he would have learned of it.
***
By her testimony, the plaintiff had specific knowledge that the route that night
was not well lit for whatever reason. Therefore, for one to commence and
continue walking into the “pitch blackness” solely on the strength of an alleged
statement made two days prior that “the route is well lit” is not reasonable
reliance as a matter of law, particularly, where it can be seen, literally, that the
statement is incorrect and unreliable. What’s more, the plaintiff has not
submitted any evidence that she did not have alternative means of getting back to
14

the hotel.

***

Prior to continuing her

walk back to the

hotel, she necessarily

weighed the danger

0f walking the rest of the way in the darkness against the reasonableness 0f
walking back in the light t0 the restaurant t0 call a cab. What she chose to d0

at

was not a matter 0f another’s negligence but one 0f her own

that point

prerogative.

Id. at

1112-1

1

13.

Just like the concierge in the foregoing case

street route selected

by the

plaintiff was not well

lit

was not shown

t0

when she opted

t0

have knowledge that the
use

properly found that Packer failed t0 present any evidence that Riverbend

known about the

lights

over the loading dock.

afﬁrmative representation was

0n

When

a result, even if the

knew

0r should have

we assume an

“implied”

justiﬁably rely

of clear evidence contrary to the representation.

and importantly, Packer’s decision

t0

proceed in the dark towards her vehicle

she could have turned back into the unlocked back door to exit through a different route, or

she could have used her cell phone for light or t0 call someone,

by the

the District Court

made by Riverbend, Packer could not under §31 1

that implied representation in the face

Lastly,

As

it,

plaintiff in

D.

Manahan. Accordingly, §311 has n0

is

the

same prerogative chosen

application in this case.

PACKER’S OTHER NEGLIGENCE THEORIES FAIL TO APPLY IN
THIS CASE.

1.

Packer has

New Negligence Claim Based Upon An Assumed Duty Of
Care Was Not Properly Raised Below And, As Such, Should Not Be
Considered On Appeal.

Packer’s

now

shifted

Brie: at pp. 12-14 that Jay

ground for a third time, arguing for the ﬁrst time

Dye assumed

a duty 0f care t0 her, in reliance

15

upon

in

her Appellate

the Restatement

3d of the Law, Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, §49(c ) and/or Featherston v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 840, 875 P.2d 937 (1994) and its progeny. She is unable to do so as,
again, it is well-established that an issue not raised below will be deemed waived and will not be
considered for the first time on appeal. See Campbell v. Parkway Surgery Center, LLC, 158
Idaho 957, 961, 354 P.3d 1172, 1176 (2015); Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass’n v. State, 127 Idaho 239,
245, 899 P.2d 949, 955 (1995); Matter of Estate of Reinwald, 122 Idaho 401, 402, 834 P.2d
1317, 1318 (1992); Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 93, 803
P.2d 993, 998 (1991); Rosales v. Balbas, 125 Idaho 848, 850, 875 P.2d 945, 947 (Ct. App. 1994).
2.

The District Court Properly Found That Riverbend Had No Duty To
Packer Independent Of The Duty Owed To A Licensee.

Even if it could be found that Packer somehow raised assumption of duty by the general
allegations in her pleadings, which she did not, the District Court properly concluded that Packer
could not establish that Riverbend owed her a duty independent of the duty owing to a licensee.
(R., Vol. 1, pp. 219-222). The District Court analyzed the few unusual circumstances that justify
a duty where one didn’t already exist: when a defendant undertakes a safety-related task that is
relied upon by others; and where there exists a special relationship that gives the defendant a
legal right to control the conduct of another, such as a parent-child relationship, employeremployee, or prisoner-guard. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 220-222).
Analyzing the undisputed facts in the record, the District Court correctly found no
general duty of care owing by Riverbend to Packer because Packer had not shown that Jay Dye
knew or should have known about the lights in the loading dock, the time that Packer would
leave the event whether or not it would be dark or not, or that Packer would walk onto the
loading dock in the dark. (Id). Packer’s latest argument in her Brief at p. 11 that knowledge of
the lights being off is imputed to Jay Dye is completely baseless and unsupported by evidence or
16

legal authority submitted below on summary judgment. As such, this new argument again
should not be considered on appeal.
Further, the District Court correctly found no assumed duty or special relationship. (R.,
Vol. 1, pp. 220-222; see also Henrie v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 162 Idaho 204, 208, 395 P.3d 824, 828 (2017) (noting that “there is
no affirmative duty to aid or protect another person, except where unusual circumstances exist
that would justify imposing an affirmative responsibility). The Court acknowledged the fact that
the alleged instruction from Jay Dye was not an undertaking of a primarily safety-related task.
(Id). The Court also took note that there was no evidence presented by Packer that would
suggest that Jay Dye’s role in the expo event was to oversee safety for the vendors and that
vendors relied upon that responsibility. (Id). He also properly found that there was no evidence
that Jay Dye had the legal right to instruct or control Packer to use a particular exit any more
than a grocery store owner could have with respect to directing its customers to use an exit. (Id).
Packer’s recent arguments in her Brief at pp. 12-13, that Jay Dye had assumed authority
to take precautions and to reduce to risk to entrants at the event, are simply without evidentiary
basis. In fact, Packer’s own deposition testimony negates her argument, because Packer
admitted that Jay Dye never told her that she could not exit through a different door. Packer
testified in relevant part as follows:
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Did he tell you what particular door on the back to use?
I thought it was weird because that not –that’s not the way that I’ve
ever done it. But he did specify and direct that it was where the
food vendor exit – I can’t quote his exact words, but I wanted
clarification. It was very clear, not a doubt in my mind that it was
this door. And I knew that the food vendors used that door as well.
Do you know how many doors are on the south side of that
building
I do not explore this area at all.

17

(R., V01. 1, p. 75,

Packer depo

at

Pg. 59:14-25

).

Okay. Here is what I’m trying t0 get at: Jay told you not t0 use
the west door. Did he tell you not to use any other door in the

Q.

building?

No. N0.

A.
(Id. at

Pg. 5829-12).

Although Packer has pointed t0 Murphy

v.

Union Pac. R.R. C0., 138 Idaho 88,91-92, 57

P.3d 799, 802-03 (2002) in her Brief at pp. 10-1

1,

arguing that

summary judgment was not

proper because “reasonable people could reach different conclusions from the pleadings and

evidence in the record”, her reliance upon

this case is

misplaced. The

Murphy

application 0n the facts in the record here, as that case dealt With a dispute
plaintiff employee’s fall, not the duty

Further, the

Murphy

different conclusions

its

0n causation

for the

railroad employee.

case does not apply because reasonable people could not reach

0n the evidence

what actually caused him

of care owing by the employer t0

case has no

t0

fall.

in the record. In

In this case, there

is

Murphy, the evidence was conﬂicting 0n
n0 disputing

that

Packer

fell

because she

chose to walk into the darkness after she exited the building through the back rather than
pursuing a different, and undeniably available,

way to

exit the building.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, and the
the District Court’s

entire record,

Riverbend requests that

54(e)(1).

it

The

Court afﬁrm

DECISION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND JUDGMENT and

DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER.
requests that

this

be granted
District

its

attorney’s fees

0n appeal pursuant

t0

Riverbend further

LC. §12-121 and/or I.R.C.P.

Court properly determined Packer’s status t0 be that 0f a licensee and

thereby established the duty of care

owed t0

Packer. Although Packer attempts t0 dispute that

determination, she fails t0 support her claim that she
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was an

invites With

any

facts

0f a beneﬁt

from her

t0 Rivel'bend.

And

ﬁnally, even ifPackel‘

had a claim

for as

an invitee, 0r for “ordinary

negligence”, she failed t0 provide admissible evidence 0f a breach 0f duty by Riverbend t0

oppose the summary judgment. As a
respectfully requests that the Court

DATED this

result,

0n the record before

afﬁrm the decisions 0f the

this Court,

Riverbend

District Court.
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